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I. INTRODUCTION
   This Article highlights a growing problem for litigants who are involved
in electronic data discovery (EDD). The world of litigation today 
encompasses massive amounts of electronically produced documents.1 
* © 2013 Ahunanya Anga.  Associate Professor of Law, Thurgood Marshall School 
of Law.  The Author thanks her family for their unwavering support, Thurgood Marshall
School of Law for the 2011 research grant that made this Article possible, and Danyahel 
Norris, Faculty Research Librarian TMSL, for his invaluable research assistance.
1. Mia Mazza et al., In Pursuit of FRCP 1: Creative Approaches To Cutting and 
Shifting the Costs of Discovery of Electronically Stored Information, 13 RICH. J.L. & 









    
 





    
  
  
    
  




    
     
  
It is estimated that ninety-nine percent of new information is created and
stored electronically.2  The litigation practice generally, as it relates to 
electronic discovery (e-discovery) particularly, has mushroomed into a 
chaotic process.3  The technological age has radically impacted the federal 
discovery process.4  The purpose of the 2006 amendments to the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) was, among other things, to address 
problems associated with electronically stored information (ESI) that 
arise during the litigation process.5 
Sanctions for failure of parties to produce and retain documents
important or even pivotal to the litigation are escalating.6  The very core 
of our adversarial system is threatened.7  Different rulings exist among 
courts where spoliation of ESI is involved.8  Litigants, without clear 
mandate from courts, are essentially embarking on “EDD litigation land 
mines.”9  Since the adoption of the new FRCP in 2006,10 there has been 
a growing rise in the imposition of sanctions by courts11 based on FRCP 
37.12  Yet, even with the rise in court-imposed sanctions, decisions by 
growth of ESI has changed the very nature of discovery, with new electronic complexities
making the preservation and production of evidence far more challenging”).
2. David K. Isom, Electronic Discovery Primer for Judges, 2005 FED. CTS. L. 
REV. 1, ¶ a.1 (Feb. 2005), http://www.fclr.org/fclr/articles/html/2005/fedctslrev1.shtml. 
3. See Mazza et al., supra note 1, ¶ 3. 
4. Martin H. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51 DUKE 
L.J. 561, 564 (2001). 
5. For reference to this purpose, see the 2006 advisory committee’s notes to FED. 
R. CIV. P. 16, 26, 33, 34, 37 & 45. 
6. See Mazza et al., supra note 1, ¶¶ 37–39. 
7. George L. Paul & Jason R. Baron, Information Inflation: Can the Legal 
System Adapt?, 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 10, ¶ 2 (2007), http://jolt.richmond.edu/v13i3/
article10.pdf (declaring that “[i]t is no exaggeration to say that litigation, as we have 
known it, is threatened by information’s new hyper-flow”); see also Rowe Entm’t, Inc.
v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (discussing cost
shifting in the production of electronic evidence). 
8. Redish, supra note 4, at 619–21. 
9. The Author coined this phrase. 
10. See generally  FED. R. CIV. P.  Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure went into effect December 1, 2006.  The amendments addressed discovery of ESI.
11. See Michael F. Flanagan, 2009 Mid-Year Update on E-Discovery Cases, GIBSON
DUNN (July 8, 2009), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2009Mid-YearUpdate 
onE-DiscoveryCases.aspx. During the first five months of 2009, courts imposed some
form of sanction mostly due to spoliation of evidence in thirty-six percent, or twenty-
two, of the cases.  Id.  In comparison with the first ten months of 2008, the 2009 numbers 
show a two-fold increase in the number of court-imposed sanctions for e-discovery. Id. 
12. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f); see generally S. New England Tel. Co. v. Global NAPs, 
Inc., 251 F.R.D. 82, 86–90, 96 (D. Conn. 2008) (granting the ultimate sanction of 
dismissal after the defendant willfully violated numerous discovery orders issued by the 
court, lied to the court about its ability to obtain and produce documents from third 
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these courts have not helped in creating objective functional criteria that 
litigants can follow to avoid e-discovery sanctions.13  This trend led the
Author to pen this Article. 
Part II analyzes courts’ approach to EDD violations and the different
standards required for sanctionable conduct.  Part III illustrates certain
trends and methodologies involving sanctions that have arisen since the 
adoption of the 2006 FRCP.14  Part IV highlights the necessary corollary 
that indistinct sanctions have had on the litigation experience. Part V
addresses the role of preservation in the sanctions process.  Finally, Part
VI concludes by examining possible solutions to ameliorate or redress the
costly and often avoidable consequences of failure to comply with best
practices regarding the preservation, production, and destruction of
electronically generated documents that may be required during the 
litigation process.
II. THE COURTS’ DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO SANCTIONS FOR 
ELECTRONIC DATA DISCOVERY VIOLATIONS
The duty to preserve includes all forms of ESI.15 As a result, EDD 
sanctions usually revolve around a party’s failure to retain, preserve, or 
produce ESI.16  FRCP 37 prohibits sanctions against a party, absent
exceptional circumstances, for failing to produce ESI lost because of
routine, good-faith business practices.17  The rule recognizes that the
massive amounts of information created must also be routinely eliminated
and such elimination should not trigger liability.18  However, according 
13. Robert Hardaway et al., E-Discovery’s Threat to Civil Litigation: Reevaluating 
Rule 26 for the Digital Age, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 521, 532 (2011). 
14. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37. 
15. Shira A. Scheindlin & Jonathan M. Redgrave, E-Discovery: Technology Requires 
Greater Care in Preserving Evidence, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2008, at 53, 53 (discussing FED. R. 
CIV. P. 37).
16. See, e.g., Flury v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 427 F.3d 939, 945 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(discussing the ultimate sanction of dismissal where the plaintiff failed to preserve a
vehicle that was the subject of the lawsuit, resulting in extreme and incurable prejudice
to the defendant); Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., No. CA 
03-5045 AI, 2005 WL 674885, at *5 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 23, 2005) (finding deliberate 
withholding of discovery and fraudulent assurances to the court and opposing counsel
about completeness of production). 
17. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e).
18. See id. 
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to courts, regardless of the massive amounts of ESI produced, depending 
on the degree of a party’s misconduct, sanctions should aptly apply.19 
Courts have broad discretion in determining sanctions for spoliation.20 
A court’s discretion is couched in the common law rules and its own 
inherent power to sanction as a means of regulating or controlling the 
course of litigation.21  Broad discretion has rendered the practice of law,
where ESI is concerned, untenable.  Courts evaluate each sanctionable 
violation on a case-by-case basis.22  Such evaluation lends credence to the
belief that litigants cannot know if their actions are “sanctionable” until
they get sanctioned.
Generally, courts prefer, where possible, to rule on the merits of a case.23 
Dismissals for spoliation of evidence are few because the role of discovery 
in litigation is to allow the parties to investigate and fish out as much
about the dispute as possible during the time set out for discovery.24 
However, once there has been a determination of spoliation, courts will
sanction the offending party.25  Several options are available to courts when
dealing with sanctionable infractions concerning ESI.26  The standard 
used in determining sanctions often depends on whether the misconduct
was negligent or grossly negligent.27  For example, negligent conduct was
found to be sufficient to award adverse inference sanctions in Residential 
Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Financial Corp., where the court found that 
the injured party suffered prejudice.28  But, in Pension Committee of the 
University of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of America Securities, LLC, 
the court found that failure to institute a litigation hold in a timely manner 
was evidence of grossly negligent conduct that would “inevitably result” 
19. Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 
685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 470–71 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (discussing available remedies for spoliation
based on the degree of the spoliator’s misconduct). 
20. Id. at 469. 
21. GEORGE L. PAUL & BRUCE H. NEARON, THE DISCOVERY REVOLUTION: 
E-DISCOVERY AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 46–47
(2006); A. Benjamin Spencer, The Preservation Obligation: Regulating and Sanctioning
Pre-Litigation Spoliation in Federal Court, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2005, 2017–18 (2011). 
22. Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 469 (quoting Fujitsu Ltd. v. Fed. Express 
Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 436 (2d Cir. 2001)).
23. Lee v. Max Int’l, L.L.C., 638 F.3d 1318, 1321 (10th Cir. 2011). 
24. Ahunanya Anga, Legal Research in an Electronic Age: Electronic Data
Discovery, a Litigation Albatross of Gigantic Proportions, 9 U. N.H. L. REV. 1, 12 (2010). 
25. See  FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f); Michael P. Zweig & Mark J. Goldberg, Electronic 
Discovery: A Brave New World, WALL ST. LAW., July 2003, at 14, available at 7 No. 2 
GLWSLAW 14.
26. See Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 469. 
27. See id. at 463. 
28. 306 F.3d 99, 113 (2d Cir. 2002). 
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in spoliation of evidence.29  Conversely, where a party holding relevant
information fails to institute a document retention policy, courts have 
found that such conduct is not evidence of sanctionable conduct.30  Yet,
there are jurisdictions where courts have held that the absence of a litigation 
hold is just negligence and nothing more.31  This means that even the
protocol of issuing litigation holds may not protect diligent litigants and 
may help slothful litigants because different courts give different weight 
to its existence or nonexistence. 
III. TRENDS IN ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY DECISIONS THAT PORTRAY 
PATTERNS FOR POTENTIAL LITIGANTS TO BE WARY OF
Growing concern exists amongst jurists and practitioners as e-discovery
matters continue to crop up in litigation.32  Jurists and practitioners are 
concerned because there is no set standard for what conduct merits 
sanctions at the federal or state level.33  The concern is driven primarily 
by the ambiguity in both federal and state courts as to what extent the
duty to preserve should apply when dealing with ESI.34  Preservation 
requirements differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and often conflict.35 
There is a lot of uncertainty in cases about the state of mind required for 
spoliation sanctions.36  Courts have noted that where conduct of the
29. 685 F. Supp. 2d at 462, 464–65. 
30. See, e.g., Haynes v. Dart, No. 08 C 4834, 2010 WL 140387, at *4 (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 11, 2010) (declaring that “[t]he failure to institute a document retention policy, in 
the form of a litigation hold, is relevant to the court’s consideration, but it is not per se
evidence of sanctionable conduct” (citing Danis v. USN Commc’ns, Inc., 53 Fed. R. 
Serv. 3d 828, 879–80 (N.D. Ill. 2000))). 
31. See, e.g., In re Old Banc One S’holders Sec. Litig., No. 00 C 2100, 2005 WL
3372783, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 8, 2005) (finding that the fact that documents were lost 
“reflects poor judgment, and the failure to create and disseminate a comprehensive 
document retention policy constitutes negligence on the part of Bank One”). 
32. See Daniel Wise, Panel Urges Caution on Sanctions for Failure To Preserve 
E-Data, 244 N.Y. L.J., Oct. 12, 2010, at 1, 8.
33. See id. 
34. Michael B. de Leeuw & Eric A. Hirsch, E-Discovery’s Oft-Overlooked Price 
Driver, 244 N.Y. L.J., Nov. 15, 2010, at S4, S5. 
35. Id. (quoting Victor Stanley, Inc. v. Creative Pipe, Inc., 269 F.R.D. 497, 523 
(D. Md. 2010)).
36. See, e.g., Victor Stanley, 269 F.R.D. at 533 (“The different approaches among
the Circuits regarding the level of culpability that must be shown to warrant imposition
of severe sanctions for spoliation is another reason why commentators have expressed 
such concern about the lack of a consensus standard and the uncertainty it causes.”); 

























   








   
offending party is bad, in that the party failed to preserve electronic data,
the party should be sanctioned based solely on culpability.37  Thus,
businesses that operate in multiple states will be unable to function 
properly if federal circuits and states require different standards for a
party to fulfill preservation obligations.38  Predictability of pre-litigation 
discovery involving ESI may take years to sort out.39  Because courts
have not reached a consensus regarding preservation obligations of
parties, parties are left with little alternative than to embark on costly 
preservation measures in order to avoid future sanctions.40  Also, courts
examine sanctionable conduct by litigants in reverse-date order.41 
Therefore, what one judge decides is sanctionable may be, in degree, at 
odds with what another judge may deem sanctionable, which just adds to
the unpredictability of the process.42 
Various circuits employ different standards or approaches to determine 
whether sanctionable conduct exists.43  The three-prong approach used 
by the Second Circuit44 to determine if sanctions are proper for a party’s
37. See Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., 
LLC, 685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (determining a party’s level of
culpability by looking at the party’s conduct during the discovery process). 
38. de Leeuw & Hirsch, supra note 34, at S5 (quoting Victor Stanley, 269 F.R.D. 
at 523, and Judge Paul W. Grimm on his concerns regarding the conflicting standards for 
ESI preservation and the costs that result).
39. Id. 
40. Id. (quoting Victor Stanley, 269 F.R.D. at 523); see also Harmonizing the Pre-
Litigation Obligation To Preserve Electronically Stored Information in New York State 
and Federal Courts, ADVISORY GROUP TO N.Y. ST.-FED. JUD. COUNCIL 8–13 (Sept.
2010), http://www.ediscoverylawalert.com/uploads/file/Advisory%20Group.pdf (discussing
the differences regarding preservation in New York State courts and federal courts). 
41. See Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, 653 F.3d 1314, 1324–27 (Fed. Cir.
2011). Nearly $500,000 in attorneys’ fees were awarded against the defendants as a 
sanction for destroying documents that should have been preserved during a patent
litigation suit. Id. at 1317.  The defendants had instituted a document retention policy
whereby the company kept no records at all, while aware of active suits as well as 
contemplated suits. Id. at 1324. Although the destruction occurred before the suit was 
filed, the court ruled that the total amount of cases filed indicated that the defendants’ 
discovery abuse merited a finding that the case was “exceptional” for purposes of 35
U.S.C. § 285.  Id. at 1317, 1324. 
42. Compare Aerogroup Int’l, Inc. v. Ozburn Hessey Logistics, LLC, No. 08 4217
(SDW) (MCA), 2011 WL 1599618, at *3 (D. N.J. Apr. 27, 2011) (reducing discovery
sanctions on appeal from $246,211 to $10,000, finding that it was a mere discovery
matter and that the party seeking sanctions for discovery abuses was not prejudiced),
with Eon-Net LP, 653 F.3d at 1324, 1328 (sanctioning the plaintiffs for destruction of
evidence caused by their failure to implement a document retention policy).
43. Point Blank Solutions, Inc. v. Toyobo Am., Inc., No. 09-61166-CIV, 2011
WL 1456029, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 5, 2011). 
44. The states that make up the Second Circuit are Connecticut, New York, and 
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failure to preserve relevant evidence requires that (1) the party having 
control over the evidence had an obligation to preserve it at the time it
was destroyed;45 (2) the records were destroyed with a “culpable state of 
mind”;46 and (3) the destroyed evidence was “relevant” to the party’s
claim or defense “such that a reasonable trier of fact could find that it 
would support that claim or defense.”47  This approach generally 
attempts to establish a known obligation by the offending party to 
preserve ESI and a failure to do so in the face of such knowledge.  For
example, in Residential Funding Corp., the district court determined 
whether there was culpable conduct by examining whether Residential 
Funding Corporation acted in bad faith or with gross negligence.48 
However, the Court of Appeals determined that culpability is established
“by a showing that the evidence was destroyed ‘knowingly, even if 
without intent to breach a duty to preserve it, or negligently.’”49 
The Second Circuit views ordinary negligence as a standard sufficient
to satisfy culpability for adverse inference instructions given as a result 
of spoliation.50  At the heart of this standard is the need to guard against 
punishing victims for the often times unintentional actions of spoliators 
who failed in their duties to preserve.51  In this circuit, a party failing “to 
issue a written litigation hold constitutes gross negligence because that 
failure is likely to result in the destruction of relevant [evidence].”52 
Although it may seem that this standard is at odds with the safe harbor 
provision of FRCP 37,53 the safe harbor provision of the rule shields
only innocent parties from potential sanctions pending their knowledge 
45. See Fujitsu Ltd. v. Fed. Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 436 (2d Cir. 2001). 
46. Phoenix Four, Inc. v. Strategic Res. Corp., No. 05 Civ. 4837(HB), 2006 WL
1409413, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2006) (quoting Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge 
Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 2002); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 
212, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
47. Residential Funding Corp., 306 F.3d at 107 (quoting Byrnie v. Town of Cromwell, 
Bd. of Educ., 243 F.3d 93, 109 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing
when the duty to preserve arises).
48. Id. at 108. 
49. Id. (quoting Byrnie, 243 F.3d at 109). 
50. Id. (“[S]anction[s] . . . should be available even for the negligent destruction
of documents if that is necessary to further the remedial purpose of the inference.” (quoting 
Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1991))). 
51. See Byrnie, 243 F.3d at 107–09. 
52. Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 
685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
53. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e). 
627
   
  
 
   
 





















of their duty to preserve.54  Once the duty to preserve is triggered, all 
protections of Rule 37 are no longer available.55  However, there is too 
much of a grey area in dealing with the duty to preserve, affording litigants
little guidance or notice.  This result was highlighted in the case of Proctor 
& Gamble Co. v. Haugen, where the court reversed the district court’s
dismissal order because there was no indication that Proctor & Gamble
had violated its duty to preserve electronic documents requested during
discovery.56 
Generally, courts use a four-tier approach to determine whether sanctions 
for discovery violations are permissible.  Before a sanction for spoliation 
of evidence warrants an adverse inference instruction, there must be a 
finding that (1) the destroyed evidence was within the party’s control;57 
(2) the party actually suppressed the evidence;58 (3) the destroyed evidence 
was relevant to the claims or defenses;59 and (4) it was foreseeable that 
the evidence would be discoverable.60  The court explained in Brewer v. 
Quaker State Oil Refining Corp. that the standard was not satisfied where
the destruction of evidence could have been caused by reasons unconnected
to the lawsuit.61  If the Third Circuit62 finds spoliation of evidence, it 
54. Ann G. Fort, Rising Costs of E-Discovery Requirements Impacting Litigants, 
LAW.COM (Mar. 20, 2007), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=900005554136&Rising
_Costs_of_EDiscovery_Requirements_Impacting_Litigants&slreturn=20130128131743. 
55. See Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 591 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting
that the duty to preserve “arises not only during litigation but also extends to that period 
before the litigation when a party reasonably should know that the evidence may be 
relevant to anticipated litigation” (citing Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 
(2d Cir. 1998))); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 216–17 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003) (holding that the duty to preserve arose before the suit was filed because 
employees of the defendant who were associated with the plaintiff recognized the 
possibility that the plaintiff would file suit).
56. See 427 F.3d 727, 740–41 (10th Cir. 2005). Proctor & Gamble was not in 
possession of the electronic information the defendants requested because the 
information was owned and maintained by a third party. Id. at 739.  Proctor & Gamble
had only limited access to the information on a rolling basis.  Id.  Because the company 
did not own the information, it was under no duty to preserve it.  Id. at 740. 
57. See Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 334 (3d Cir. 1995)
(citing Gumbs v. Int’l Harvester, Inc., 718 F.2d 88, 96 (3d Cir. 1983)). 
58. Id. 
59. Veloso v. W. Bedding Supply Co., 281 F. Supp. 2d 743, 746 (D. N.J. 2003)
(citing Costello v. City of Brigantine, No. CIV. A. 99-4072(JBS), 2001 WL 732402, at 
*26 (D. N.J. June 28, 2001)). 
60. Id. (citing Scott v. IBM Corp., 196 F.R.D. 233, 248 (D. N.J. 2000)). 
61. Brewer, 72 F.3d at 334 (holding that the district court’s refusal to draw an 
adverse inference was correct where an in-house attorney died after taking possession of 
a file and the defendants failed to locate the file after continuous searches).
62. The states making up the Third Circuit are Delaware, New Jersey, and 
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establishes sanctions by examining the spoliator’s degree of fault on
balance with the prejudice caused.63 
Though not a four-tier approach, the Eleventh Circuit64 does not give
adverse inference jury instruction sanctions for spoliation of evidence
without a showing of bad faith.65  Further, in addition to a showing of bad
faith, accusers must also show that the “missing evidence is crucial to their
ability to prove their prima facie case.”66  Specifically, if an accuser cannot 
produce evidence that categorically establishes sanctionable conduct by the
accused, courts will not assume that the production of certain evidence by
an accuser constitutes the failure to produce other evidence by the accused.67 
This high burden of showing that evidence is crucial to a case before 
spoliation can be found is directly at odds with the Second Circuit’s lower
burden requirement of a finding of negligence.68 
The Eleventh Circuit, to further complicate the issue of spoliation
sanctions, does not have a uniform definition or explanation of what 
63. See, e.g., Mosaid Techs. Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 348 F. Supp. 2d 332, 335
(D. N.J. 2004) (giving the standard for determining whether spoliation sanctions are
justified as “(1) the degree of fault of the party who altered or destroyed the evidence; 
(2) the degree of prejudice suffered by the opposing party; and (3) whether there is a 
lesser sanction that will avoid substantial unfairness to the opposing party and, where the 
offending is seriously at fault, will serve to deter such conduct by others in the future” 
(quoting Schmid v. Milwaukee Electric Tool Corp., 13 F.3d 76, 79 (3d Cir. 1994)
(internal quotation marks omitted))).
64. The states making up the Eleventh Circuit are Alabama, Florida, and Georgia. 
28 U.S.C. § 41. 
65. Point Blank Solutions, Inc. v. Toyobo Am., Inc., No. 09-61166-CIV, 2011 
WL 1456029, at *1, *8–12 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 5, 2011) (discussing the standard for a finding 
granting adverse inference jury instructions as a sanction for failure to produce deleted 
emails).
66. Id. at *1; see also Calixto v. Watson Bowman Acme Corp., No. 07-60077-
CIV, 2009 WL 3823390, at *16 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 16, 2009) (stating that parties must
establish “evidence once existed that could fairly be supposed to have been material to
the proof or defense of a claim at issue in the case” where the court found that the 
defendants were not put on notice that litigation was imminent and therefore the duty to 
preserve was not triggered). 
67. See Point Blank Solutions, 2011 WL 1456029, at *9. 
68. Compare Managed Care Solutions, Inc. v. Essent Healthcare, Inc., 736 F.
Supp. 2d 1317, 1327–28 (S.D. Fla. 2010) (holding that destroyed e-mails were not 
crucial to the case because the plaintiff could still prove the case from evidence obtained 
from and through other means), with Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 













   
  













constitutes spoliation.69  Some courts require that the spoliator’s act be 
intentional, while others do not.70  For instance, in Corporate Financial,
Inc. v. Principle Life Insurance Co., the court failed to include an intention 
prerequisite in its spoliation definition.71  Yet, in the later case Calixo v. 
Watson Bowman Acme Corp., the intention prerequisite is included in
the definition of spoliation.72  Such confusion about what is required in a 
definition can cause only uneven applications and results in sanction 
cases.  
   The Fifth Circuit,73 like the Eleventh Circuit, will only apply the
severest sanctions of striking pleadings, granting an adverse inference
jury instruction, or granting default judgment where the spoliation of 
evidence is as a result of bad faith or bad conduct.74 Mere negligence is 
not enough to satisfy this standard because using a negligence standard 
would generate insufficient evidence to conclude that the spoliating 
party was aware of the fact that the party’s case was weak.75  The court’s
approach in determining culpability is illustrated in King v. Illinois Central 
Railroad, where the court concluded that there was no bad conduct to
warrant an adverse inference sanction.76 The plaintiff in King waited at
least three years after the accident in question to request records that 
could show wrongdoing on the part of the defendant railroad, by which 
time the evidence needed had been destroyed.77 
Other circuits require a showing of bad faith to warrant spoliation 
sanctions, specifically the Sixth,78 Seventh,79 Eighth,80 Tenth,81 and D.C.
69. Point Blank Solutions, 2011 WL 1456029, at *8. 
70. Id. 
71. See No. 05-20595-CIV, 2006 WL 3365606, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 20, 2006). 
72. See No. 07-60077-CIV, 2009 WL 3823390, at *13, *14 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 16, 
2009).
73. The states making up the Fifth Circuit are Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas. 
28 U.S.C. § 41 (2006). 
74. See, e.g., Condrey v. SunTrust Bank of Ga., 431 F.3d 191, 203 (5th Cir. 2005)
(noting that “[t]he Fifth Circuit permits an adverse inference against the destroyer of 
evidence only upon a showing of ‘bad faith’ or ‘bad conduct’” (quoting King v. Ill. Cent. 
R.R., 337 F.3d 550, 556 (5th Cir. 2003))); see also Vick v. Tex. Emp’t Comm’n, 514
F.2d 734, 737 (5th Cir. 1975) (noting that “[m]ere negligence is not enough” to warrant 
an instruction on spoliation); Riverside Healthcare, Inc. v. Sysco Food Servs. of San 
Antonio, LP (In re Riverside Healthcare, Inc.), 393 B.R. 422, 428 (Bankr. M.D. La.
2008) (“[T]he party accused of destroying the evidence must be shown to have been in
bad faith or to have engaged in bad conduct.” (citing Consol. Aluminum Corp. v. Alcoa, 
Inc., 244 F.R.D. 335, 340 (M.D. La. 2006))). 
75. See United States v. Wise, 221 F.3d 140, 156 (5th Cir. 2000). 
76. 337 F.3d 550, 556 (5th Cir. 2003). 
77. See id. 
78. See, e.g., Global Technovations, Inc. v. Onkyo U.S.A. Corp. (In re Global 
Technovations, Inc.), 431 B.R. 739, 780 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2010) (citing Forest Labs., 
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Circuits.82  A spoliator who satisfies the bad faith standard for destruction of
evidence or for failure to preserve evidence has already acted in a
manner unbecoming of the profession and should be sanctioned. 
The differing standards among the circuits for imposing spoliation 
sanctions for discovery misconduct is further illuminated by the fact that 
several circuits, specifically the First,83 Fourth,84 and Ninth85 Circuits, do 
Mich. Apr. 14, 2009)).  The states making up the Sixth Circuit are Kentucky, Michigan, 
Ohio, and Tennessee.  28 U.S.C. § 41.
79. See, e.g., Faas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 532 F.3d 633, 644 (7th Cir. 2008).
The states making up the Seventh Circuit are Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin.  28 U.S.C. 
§ 41.
80. See, e.g., Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R., 354 F.3d 739, 746 (8th Cir. 2004). 
The states comprising the Eight Circuit are Arkansas, Iowa, Missouri, Nebraska, North
Dakota, and South Dakota.  28 U.S.C. § 41. 
81. See, e.g., Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398, 1407 (10th Cir. 1997). 
The states comprising the Tenth Circuit are Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma,
Utah, and Wyoming.  28 U.S.C. § 41. 
82. See, e.g., Wyler v. Korean Air Lines Co., 928 F.2d 1167, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 
1991) (“Mere innuendo . . . does not justify drawing the adverse inference requested . . . .”);
see also Moore v. Napolitano, 723 F. Supp. 2d 167, 169–72 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (discussing
on appeal, the imposition of severe sanctions where the court found the defendant’s 
failure to timely respond to court orders involving electronic document production as 
evidence of willful conduct sufficient to warrant sanctions). The D.C. Circuit reviews 
cases on appeal from federal agencies.  28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2013).  The Administrative 
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 703 (2006), further grants jurisdiction to this circuit to hear
cases from other agencies where the agency’s statute does not expressly indicate 
jurisdiction by the D.C. Circuit. 
83. See, e.g., Sacramona v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 106 F.3d 444, 447 (1st
Cir. 1997) (stating that “[c]ertainly bad faith is a proper and important consideration in 
deciding whether and how to sanction conduct resulting in the destruction of evidence. 
But bad faith is not essential. If such evidence is mishandled through carelessness, and
the other side is prejudiced, we think that the district court is entitled to consider 
imposing sanctions, including exclusion of the evidence.”).  The states comprising the
First Circuit are Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island.  28 U.S.C. 
§ 41.
84. See, e.g., Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 593 (4th Cir. 2001)
(discussing dismissal for a party’s failure to preserve evidence relevant to the litigation,
noting that dismissal is “usually justified only in circumstances of bad faith”; however, 
“even when conduct is less culpable, dismissal may be necessary if the prejudice to the
defendant is extraordinary, denying it the ability to adequately defend its case”).  The 
states comprising the Fourth Circuit are Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Virginia, and West Virginia.  28 U.S.C. § 41. 
85. See, e.g., In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., 462 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1077–78
(N.D. Cal. 2006) (stating that “[t]he court’s inherent authority to impose sanctions for the 
wrongful destruction of evidence includes the power to exclude evidence that, given the 
spoliation, would ‘unfairly prejudice an opposing party’” and further noting that “preclusion
631
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not require bad faith on the part of the spoliator but instead require only
a finding of extreme prejudice to the party making the accusation of 
spoliation.  Because this approach requires only that the accuser suffer
extreme prejudice, it fails to protect the truly innocent.  The bad faith 
approach shows promise and should be adopted by all circuits or at least 
included in the definition of what constitutes spoliation.  The ability to 
establish bright guidelines for litigants must be grounded in a policy or
rule that covers all possibilities. Hence, bad faith or prejudice to the
accuser must coexist in any inquiry to determine sanctions by courts.
Yet, courts must also be careful not to place a high burden of proof on an 
accuser who has suffered prejudice at the hands of a spoliator.86  Such a
burden on an accuser would be at odds with the purpose and punishment
nature of spoliation sanctions.87 
Also, even between the state courts, there is another level of divide 
when determining spoliation sanctions.  Some states have held that spoliation 
of evidence gives rise to a tort action based on intentional interference
with prospective civil action.88 Yet, the majority of states find no separate 
common law tort action for spoliation of evidence.89 
The duty to preserve is often not clear and can be complicated and
quite hard to institute.90  Regardless of this fact, “the duty to preserve 
potential evidence is essential to the courts’ truth-seeking function.”91 
Courts admonish that the duty to preserve is set in motion when a party
reasonably anticipates litigation.92  Therefore, to determine if the duty
sanctions . . . depend[] on the extent to which plaintiffs were prejudiced” (quoting Unigard 
Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lakewood Eng’g & Mfg. Corp., 982 F.2d 363, 368 (9th Cir. 1992))). 
The states comprising the Ninth Circuit are Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho,
Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington.  28 U.S.C. § 41. 
86. See Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 128 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating that
once a party has suffered prejudice at the hand of a spoliator, courts must not hold “the 
prejudiced party to too strict a standard of proof regarding the likely contents of the
destroyed evidence” because such an action “would subvert the prophylactic and
punitive purposes” of spoliation sanctions).
87. Id. 
88. Hazen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 718 P.2d 456, 463 (Alaska 1986). 
89. See, e.g., Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr. v. Superior Court, 954 P.2d 511, 521 (Cal.
1998) (disapproving prior cases and holding that no tort remedy exists “for the 
intentional spoliation of evidence by a party” if the party knew or had reason to know 
about the spoliation before the start of trial or before other court decisions on the merits 
of the action). 
90. See Kenneth J. Withers, Electronically Stored Information: The December
2006 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. 
PROP. 171, 188 (2006) (stating that preservation issues and the resulting spoliation
problems are “the most vexing issues in electronic discovery”).
91. Id. at 189. 
92. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); see 
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was or has been triggered, courts have to examine and assess each case
differently because case facts are not the same.93  To further add to the
confusion, courts delve into discovering exactly which parties were aware 
of the possibility that litigation was probable.94  Thus, at two stages of 
the litigation process, courts have to determine when the preservation duty
attached—at the earliest onset of litigation and then again once a motion
for spoliation is made.95  Further, in today’s e-discovery climate, judges
are intricately involved in setting threshold rules to deal with e-discovery
because of the growing number of cases dealing with preservation in 
e-discovery cases.96 Prior to the electronic age, this had not been the case.97 
During the first ten months of 2010, of eighty-four e-discovery cases 
reviewed, thirty-nine percent dealt with sanctions, and of that percentage,
forty-nine percent involved preservation and spoliation issues.98  When 
courts have to engage in such detailed fact-finding in order to determine 
if preservation duties have been breached, it adds a different tone to the 
litigation process.  Such a process does little to assuage the fears of litigants 
embroiled in e-discovery battles and the ensuing possible repercussions. 
preserve once litigants knew or should have known that subject information may be 
relevant to future litigation).
93. See Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., 
LLC, 685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
94. See Zubulake, 220 F.R.D. at 217. 
95. Withers, supra note 90, at 189. 
96. See Craig Ball, Piecing Together the E-Discovery Plan, TRIAL, June 2008, at 
20, 22 n.3 (“[S]even states have adopted e-discovery rules hewing closely to the federal 
rules (Arizona, Indiana, Louisiana, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, and Utah); another 
14 states are considering changes to their court rules to address e-discovery.”).  These
fourteen states are Alaska, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, 
Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Tennessee, Virginia, and Washington.  Brett 
Burney, Mining E-Discovery Stateside, LAW TECH. NEWS (Jan. 18, 2008), http://www.law.
com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=1200594602161. 
97. Ball, supra note 96, at 28 (“[T]he meet-and-confer process is likely to endure
and grow within federal and state procedure.”). 
98. Year In Review: Kroll Ontrack 2010 Discovery Trend Data Reveals 
Organizations Struggle with Preservation, Production and General Discovery Protocols, 
KROLL ONTRACK (Dec. 7, 2010), http://www.krollontrack.com/company/news-releases/ 
?getPressRelease=61500 [hereinafter KROLL ONTRACK]. Kroll Ontrack is a technology
firm specializing in consulting, products, and service solutions in the areas of data 
recovery, paper and electronic discovery, document review, computer forensics, secure 
information, and ESI.  Id.
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Because these “e-battles”99 take place prior to the merits of a case, 
interference or delay to the main case is always at stake.100 
Courts differ as to when sanctions should apply because the standards 
used by different courts vary.  Some are of the opinion that sanctions 
should apply only if an accuser can prove documents existed and that 
such documents were destroyed due to the spoliating party’s failure to 
preserve the documents.101  Cases where accusers can prove that relevant 
documents existed and spoliators failed to produce such documents lend
support to the belief that something other than possible bad conduct must be
the impetus behind a court’s decision to impose sanctions.102  Therefore,
just because information is destroyed, there should be no automatic
guarantee of sanctions.103  To invoke sanctions after the loss of ESI, at a 
minimum, the lost information must be shown to be relevant to the 
issues involved in the case.104
   The Supreme Court has mandated that terminating sanctions or default 
sanctions should be hinged on “willfulness, bad faith, or any fault” of a 
party and should not apply where the failure to comply is based on an
inability to comply.105  For courts that follow this methodology, the burden 
of proof rests squarely on the accuser.106  Further, our legal system dictates
that accusers must prove their case against the accused.107 But in 
99. The Author uses this term to describe the prelitigation meetings and hearings
now required to resolve e-discovery issues. 
100. See Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, 653 F.3d 1314, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2011) 
(affirming the lower court’s decision to award attorneys’ fees of almost $500,000 for 
misconduct regarding the failure to preserve documents, among other things). 
101. See Orbit One Commc’ns, Inc. v. Numerex Corp., 271 F.R.D. 429, 439 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
102. See In re NTL, Inc. Sec. Litig., 244 F.R.D. 179, 183, 198–99 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(discussing sanctions for a spoliator who admitted that relevant documents no longer
existed where the accuser, a former employee, had requested copies of his e-mails before 
leaving his employment and produced many relevant e-mails that the defendants failed to 
produce); H. Christopher Boehning & Daniel J. Toal, Six Hard-Learned Lessons About 
EDD, LAW TECH. NEWS (Mar. 2, 2007), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=90000555
3831&Six_HardLearned_Lessons_About_EDD&slreturn=20130431174239. 
103. Orbit One Commc’ns, 271 F.R.D. at 438 (discussing the importance of 
relevance in applying sanctions for electronic information lost during the pendency of a 
suit).
104. See Byrnie v. Town of Cromwell, Bd. of Educ., 243 F.3d 93, 109 (2d Cir. 
2001); Orbit One Commc’ns, 271 F.R.D. at 438. 
105. Nat’l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 640 (1976)
(per curiam) (quoting Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 212 (1958)).
106. See Calixto v. Watson Bowman Acme Corp., No. 07-60077-CIV, 2009 WL 
3823390, at *13–17 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 16, 2009) (stating that parties must establish that
“evidence once existed that could fairly be supposed to have been material to the proof
or defense of a claim at issue in the case” where no direct evidence of bad intent exists). 
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e-discovery cases, this becomes a tough burden because in order for an
accuser to prove the existence or nonexistence of documents, the accuser 
must have either made copies of the destroyed documents or somehow 
heard from others of a document’s existence.108  Such a tough burden
may end up working against an accuser’s favor—thwarting the purpose 
of the e-discovery process. 
   Some courts use FRCP 26109 as the governing standard when dealing 
with the duty to preserve electronic evidence.  These courts apply a broad 
standard for disclosure and discovery of evidence.110  Generally, “[b]road
discovery is [the] cornerstone of the litigation process contemplated by 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”111  These rules are accorded broad 
treatment to engender the “[m]utual knowledge of all . . . relevant facts,” 
thereby allowing parties to flesh out their claims with minimal burden.112 
This approach, though admirable in its essence, still fails to give litigants
direction in their quest to avoid sanctions for EDD violations.  Therefore,
once again courts will have to find a way to keep litigants on the straight
and narrow regarding e-discovery protocols.  These protocols would factor 
in when e-discovery violations are not so blatant. Most courts easily 
handle blatant e-discovery violations.113
   Courts seem to be moving toward the direction of using EDD sanctions as
a sword and a shield.  Rule 37 already provides a host of sanctions courts
can use when parties fail to obey their orders.114  Once a party fails to 
108. See Sampson v. City of Cambridge, 251 F.R.D. 172, 183 (D. Md. 2008) (holding 
that where the plaintiff was unable to establish that “access to [the defendant’s] emails
would have produced evidence which a reasonable factfinder could conclude supported
her claims,” the court must deny the plaintiff’s sanction motion against the defendant). 
109. FED. R. CIV. P. 26. 
110. See id. 26(b)(1); see also Arista Records LLC v. Usenet.com, Inc., 608 F. 
Supp. 2d 409, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (discussing the broad discovery standard that includes 
any evidence “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence” 
(quoting Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1991))). 
111. Jones v. Goord, No. 95 CIV. 8026(GEL), 2002 WL 1007614, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 
May 16, 2002). 
112. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947). 
113. See, e.g., S. New England Tel. Co. v. Global NAPs, Inc., 251 F.R.D. 82, 92, 
96 (D. Conn. 2008) (finding that “wiping” software used on an employee’s computer
warranted default judgment because the court found the behavior intentional, done in bad 
faith, and sufficient to support an inference that the evidence was destroyed because it 
was harmful to the destroying party). 
114. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(A). Rule 37 offers a list of possible sanctions for
failure of a party to obey a court order.  This list includes striking a pleading in whole or 
in part, dismissing the action or proceeding in whole or in part, and rendering default 
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obey a court’s production order, the court, under Rule 37(b) and its own 
inherent power, can sanction the offending party.115  When cases involving 
EDD are at issue and the conduct of litigants during production of EDD is
so egregious, courts will mete out sanctions in a prohibitive manner.116 
Yet, even when awarding termination sanctions, courts will still weigh
the likelihood of errant conduct of litigants in determining whether to
grant dismissal sanctions.117  Courts use factors that are evaluated against 
conduct of offending litigants.118  Further, courts will use sanctions not
only to punish uncooperative offenders but also to send a chilling message
of deterrence to possible future offenders.119  This chilling message is
being heard loud and clear by potential litigants.  Because lawyers abhor
the unknown, the dread and angst surrounding the e-discovery process is
palpable.120  Hence, there is a need for a better mechanism or procedure to
help assuage litigants’ fears.  A single uniform or predictable standard must 
be adopted. The five factors courts have annunciated to determine dismissal
can easily be used to determine e-discovery sanctions.121  The factors are
well known by all courts and would require only application to the specific
judgment against the disobedient party. Id.  However, the listed sanctions are not exhaustive
and act as suggestions, as the rule states that sanctions “may” include. Id.  Thus, courts 
have broad discretion in awarding sanctions. 
115. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b); see also Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 
212, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (stating that “[t]he authority to sanction litigants for spoliation
arises jointly under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the court’s own inherent 
powers”).
116. See, e.g., Lee v. Max Int’l, LLC, 638 F.3d 1318, 1319 (10th Cir. 2011) 
(discussing the ultimate punishment of dismissal of the plaintiffs’ suit, with prejudice, by
the district court for the plaintiffs’ repeated failure to comply with the defendant’s request for
production and for the plaintiffs’ failure to comply with two court orders requesting the 
plaintiffs to produce discovery documents). 
117. See Ehrenhaus v. Reynolds, 965 F.2d 916, 921–22 (10th Cir. 1992). 
118. Id. at 921 (discussing the factors courts utilize in determining whether to
dismiss a case).  The factors to be considered are “‘(1) the degree of actual prejudice to
the defendant; (2) the amount of interference with the judicial process; . . . (3) the culpability
of the litigant’; (4) whether the court warned the party in advance that dismissal of the
action would be a likely sanction for noncompliance; and (5) the efficacy of lesser
sanctions.” Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Ocelot Oil Corp. v. Sparrow Indus., 847 F.3d
1458, 1465 (10th Cir. 1988)). 
119. See DL v. District of Columbia, 274 F.R.D. 320, 321–22 (D. D.C. 2011) 
(discussing defendants who repeatedly failed to abide by court orders concerning their
production obligation, which prompted the court to grant the plaintiffs’ motion to compel 
and note that the defendants’ conduct was so flagrant that “[a] discovery violation of this 
exotic magnitude is literally unheard of in this Court”).
120. See Gina Passarella, Lawyers Struggle To Get a Grasp on E-Discovery, LAW 
TECH. NEWS (Aug. 10, 2011), http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN. 
jsp?id=1202510650344&Lawyers_Struggle_to_Get_a_Grasp_on_EDiscovery. 
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e-discovery dispute before the court. This way, litigants know ahead of
time what they are up against. 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OR CONSEQUENCES OF INDISTINCT SANCTIONS 
When courts fail to give clear guidelines regarding ESI and fail to give
adequate notice to litigants about what is and what is not sanctionable 
conduct, the practice of law takes on a landmine-like quality.  Often, as 
the chasm between the competing interests of the bench and the bar
grows—the bench ensuring broad discovery versus the litigant’s interest in
ensuring that the astounding cost of e-discovery is controlled—the
fundamental worth of litigation is rapidly being undermined.122 
Accordingly, e-discovery costs in litigation can account for fifty to eighty 
percent of litigation costs.123  This is quite understandable when it is
estimated that over ninety percent of information is created in an electronic
format.124 Therefore, looking at the enormity, vastness, and various forms 
of electronic information makes it easy to see the complexities and 
exorbitant costs involved in e-discovery litigation.125  These costs represent 
a growing strain on all players in the litigation process—companies, law 
firms, solo attorneys, and ultimately clients.126 The e-discovery battle will
become even more calamitous as newer ways to efficiently store and
retrieve information are reached.127  No sector of litigation is exempt. Even
government agencies are faced with the burgeoning costs of e-discovery.128 
The electronic age has afforded other professions noteworthy 
advancements in terms of storage capacities and retrieval of information, 
122. Passarella, supra note 120. 
123. Id.
 124. THE SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GRP. ON BEST PRACTICES FOR ELEC.
DOCUMENT RETENTION & PROD., THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS
& PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION 1 (2005), available 
at https://thesedonaconference.org/publication/The%20Sedona%20Principles; Steven C.
Bennett & Cecilia R. Dickson, E-Discovery May Be a Job for Special Masters: They 
Might Show a Way Around the Complexities Inherent in the Process, NAT’L L.J., July 17, 
2006, at S5. 
125. See Mazza et al., supra note 1, ¶¶ 2–6. 
126. See Stanley M. Gibson, Hit ‘Delete’ To Prevent EDD Disaster, CORP. COUNS. 
(Aug. 7, 2007), http://www.law.com/corporatecounsel/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=900005488122
&Hit_Delete_to_Prevent_EDD_Disaster.
 127. See Passarella, supra note 120. 
128. Jason Krause, Government Agencies Look Within To Solve E-Discovery Woes, 
CORP. COUNS. (Aug. 15, 2011), http://www.law.com/corporatecounsel/PubArticleCC. 
jsp?id=1202511327606&Government_Agencies_Look_Within_to_Solve_EDiscovery_Woes. 
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as well as the ability to keep records easily accessible for future use.129 
These same advancements have been an advantage as well as an Achilles’
heel130 to the practice of law where e-discovery plays a factor.131  Prior to 
the advent of the electronic age, litigation was about getting to the truth. 
Prior to the electronic age, the truth was obtained using paper documents 
to satisfy discovery requests where each party, in accordance with civil 
procedure rules, essentially bore its own cost of producing responsive
documents.132 However, in today’s electronic age, truth, as far as discovery 
is concerned, has become a moving target.  “[D]iscovery is not just about 
uncovering the truth, but also about how much of the truth the parties can 
afford to disinter.”133  As many opined, e-discovery has given rise to
previously unseen costs and burdens, which were new to traditional
discovery.134  Thus, “the greatest weakness of the US court system is its 
expense.  And the driving factor for that expense is discovery excesses.”135 
As a result, “[the] courts are in danger already of becoming an intolerably 
expensive way to protect innovation or prove freedom to operate.”136  Thus,
adding to the already prohibitive costs, when courts sanction parties and
there are no clear-cut guidelines as to what or when actions are sanctionable, 
litigants are open to unforeseen consequences during the pendency of the 
suit.  Many organizations do not have clear information management and
discovery protocols.137  As a result, organizations become reliant on case
law that can change drastically or be incongruous depending on the 
jurisdiction.138 
129. Kenneth J. Withers, The Real Cost of Virtual Discovery, FED. DISCOVERY NEWS, 
Feb. 2001, at 3, 3. 
130. From Greek mythology, Achilles was a Greek war hero believed to have been 
dipped in the River Styx as a child and made invulnerable.  Every part of his body except 
his heel was submerged in the river.  He was killed during the Trojan War by an arrow 
that fatally pierced his heel—his only weak spot. 
131. Withers, supra note 129, at 3. 
132. See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978) (discussing
the role of the court in determining a party’s burden when cost shifting is at issue because of a
party’s duty to comply with court orders).
133. Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (quoting
Rowe Entm’t, Inc. v. William Morris Agency, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 421, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).
134. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 4, at 561. 
135. Randall R. Rader, Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fed. Circuit, 
Speech at the Fifteenth Annual Eastern District of Texas Bench and Bar Conference: The
State of Patent Litigation (Sept. 27, 2011), in 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 331, 336 (2012). 
136. Id. at 337. 
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   Attorneys are fearful and apprehensive of e-discovery.139  This fear stems
from popular belief that lawsuits involving e-discovery can quickly end in
settlement, once one side requests production of electronic documents.140 
Sanctions on parties who fail to properly handle ESI are well known by
litigants.141  Courts are imposing sanctions for spoliation of evidence as 
well as for late production of evidence.142 Plus, revenue from e-discovery
markets is at an all-time high and is expected to continue to grow.143  Profits 
for e-discovery markets are growing in large part because litigants are
spending on e-discovery vendors to ensure protection from sanctions.144 
When litigation costs escalate due to sanctions, or even the possibility or
threat of sanctions, a bleak picture emerges wielding a substantial blow to
the U.S. litigation process.145  A party’s duty regarding the avoidance of
sanctions must be clear.  It is the responsibility of courts to provide the
clarity.146 
Although the e-discovery rules were added to address the change from 
paper discovery to e-discovery, the change has had the effect of slowing 
down the litigation process and is squarely at odds with the goal that the 
drafters had in mind when proposing FRCP 1.147  If the drafters were
originally concerned about a speedy litigation process, they would have 
never imagined the degree to which the electronic age has bogged down
the process once again.148  In true litigation fashion, both sides of the aisle
139. Passarella, supra note 120. 
140. See Redish, supra note 4, at 601–02. 
141. Fort, supra note 54. 
142. Id.
 143. See Evan Koblentz, E-Discovery Market Predicted To Reach $1.5B in 2013, 
LAW TECH. NEWS (May 23, 2011), http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticle 
LTN.jsp?id=1202494788349. 
144. See id.
 145. Anga, supra note 24, at 15. 
146. See Mark Michels, The Story Behind Delaware’s Default E-Discovery Standard, 
LAW TECH. News (Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticle
LTN.jsp?id=1202539401259&The_Story_Behind_Delawares_Default_EDiscovery_Standard
(discussing how Delaware has been at the helm of e-discovery guidelines in that the 
courts there have developed a default e-discovery standard that covers ESI). 
147. FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (language amended 2007). The drafters had envisaged that the 
rule would help guarantee “the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.”
Id.
 148. See Kevin A. Griffiths, Comment, The Expense of Uncertainty: How a Lack of
Clear E-Discovery Standards Put Attorneys and Clients in Jeopardy, 45 IDAHO L. REV. 
441, 442 (2009) (discussing the practical and financial burdens ESI creates in the practice of
law).
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blame the other side for the problem.  On the one hand, defense attorneys
believe that plaintiffs, knowing that large firms have large amounts of 
electronic documents, use this knowledge to press to their advantage 
settlement of the dispute.149  On the other hand, plaintiff attorneys feel that
defense attorneys have the advantage because they get to decide or regulate
search term variants during meet and confer150 Rule 26151 conference
meetings.152 
To further compound matters, electronic information has many forms.153 
Because electronic information can be produced in different forms, disputes 
often involve litigation diversionary games, with each party seeking to 
lessen its discovery responsibilities while simultaneously setting up
e-discovery road blocks for opposing counsel.154  Litigation diversionary
games have led to increased discovery motions and “overreaching,
obstruction and extensive, but unproductive discovery disputes in some 
cases precluding adjudication on the merits altogether.”155  When discovery
disputes are so drawn out and out of control, it makes it difficult to bring
traditional cases to court.156 Instead, parties may simply decide to settle
or decide not to pursue litigation at all due to expense.157  Regardless of 
what each side believes or does, one thing is sure: cases involving motions 
to compel discovery and motions for sanctions are quickly becoming 
sanction battles,158 with each side using e-discovery as a tactical weapon,159 
which was rare prior to the advent of e-discovery.  In such battles, judges
are forced to engage in and sort out e-discovery issues between parties.160 
149. Passarella, supra note 120. 
150. See  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f); see also  THE SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GRP. 
ON ELEC. DOCUMENT RETENTION & PROD., THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES 
RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT PRODUCTION 21 
(2d ed. 2007), available at http://www.sos.mt.gov/Records/committees/erim_resources/ 
A%20-%20Sedona%20Principles%20Second%20Edition.pdf (discussing the requirements 
of FRCP 26(f) and associated issues). 
151. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(1), (3)(C) (requiring litigants to start conferencing in the
early stages of litigation when e-discovery is involved).
152. See Passarella, supra note 120. 
153. Withers, supra note 90, at 186. 
154. Id.
155. Cecil Lynn III & Alexandra Hicks, E-Discovery Rulings: 2008 in Review, 
LAW.COM (Jan. 9 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202427363555&EDiscovery
_Rulings_2008_in_Review (emphasis omitted) (quoting Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs.
Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 360 (D. Md. 2008)).
156. Martha Neil, OK, Discovery’s a Problem, But What Can Be Done About It?, 
A.B.A. J. (Sept. 11, 2008, 1:30 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/ok_disc 
overys_a_problem_but_what_can_be_done_about_it. 
157. Id.
158.  Bennett & Dickson, supra note 124, at S5. 
159. Rader, supra note 135, at 336. 
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Increased judicial involvement in discovery matters forces courts to become
involved in time-wasting minute details of capacious e-discovery
collections.161 Each case involving e-discovery and ensuing sanctions is
clearly different.162  As a result, sanction rulings have failed to give potential
litigants adequate warning of sanctionable conduct beyond the widely 
known and quoted seminal cases because states and circuits are divided by
their own definitions of what constitutes sanctionable conduct.163 
These divisions—different approaches—have resulted in forum 
shopping, another consequence of indistinct sanctions for e-discovery
violations. The varying standards among different circuits will engender 
opportunistic approaches to case filing. For example, the Eleventh Circuit 
noted, during a motion to determine sanctions, the different standards 
required for a spoliation finding in the different circuits.164  Additionally, 
the court opined that had the matter been in another circuit, the results
may have been different.165  Courts, litigants, and their attorneys are aware
of the different circuit approaches to sanctions.166  The different standards
161. Id.
 162. See, e.g., Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003) (finding that the party that destroyed e-mails must bear the other party’s cost of
redeposing witnesses for the purpose of inquiring into the issues raised by the destroyed 
e-mails); Thompson v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93, 103–05 (D.
Md. 2003) (holding that sanctions were appropriate where a party failed to produce
responsive e-mail records until long after the discovery cut-off date); Coleman (Parent)
Holdings, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., No. CA 03-5045 AI, 2005 WL 674885, at *5
(Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 23, 2005) (finding deliberate the withholding of discovery and fraudulent 
assurances to the court and opposing counsel about the completeness of productions). 
163. Spencer, supra note 21, at 2005–06 (arguing that preservation obligations are 
different in the states and circuits because regulating prelitigation preservation is done 
through the court’s inherent power, resulting in inconsistent sanction determinations by
courts).
164. Point Blank Solutions, Inc. v. Toyobo Am., Inc., No. 09-61166-CIV, 2011
WL 1456029, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 5, 2011) (discussing the standard for a finding granting 
adverse inference jury instructions as a sanction for failure to produce deleted e-mails). 
165. Id.  The court denied the motion to determine spoliation of evidence and
appropriate sanctions because the defendants were under a duty to others—and not Point
Blank Solutions—to preserve evidence, and the parties that the defendants were under a 
duty to preserve evidence for were not parties to the current litigation. Id.
 166. See Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 593 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting 
that dismissal is “usually justified only in circumstances of bad faith . . . .  But even when
conduct is less culpable, dismissal may be necessary if the prejudice to the defendant is 
extraordinary, denying it the ability to adequately defend its case.”); Sacramona v. 
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 106 F.3d 444, 447 (1st Cir. 1997) (“Certainly bad faith is a
proper and important consideration in deciding whether and how to sanction conduct
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and the problem of determining sanctions are further illustrated in the Third
Circuit, where a split exists within the circuit itself regarding what
constitutes actual suppression by a spoliator.167  Thus, in New Jersey,
where evidence is negligently destroyed, a court may grant an adverse
inference sanction,168 while in the Middle District of Pennsylvania,
intentional conduct is required for the imposition of sanctions.169  Finally, 
in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, a spoliator’s conduct must be willful 
or fraudulent to merit sanctions.170  For litigants, the import of this circuit
split will be determined on where the suit is filed in the circuit.171 
V. IS PRESERVATION THE CULPRIT? 
Scholars postulate that spoliation involving electronic evidence must
be handled differently from traditional spoliation issues.172  These  
arguments suggest that the expense and burden of e-discovery is so different 
in degree and magnitude from paper discovery that the judiciary must 
develop new or different standards to combat the problem.173  Others  
argue that the problem of sanctions for e-discovery violations arises
from the different preservation requirements determined by courts.174 
However, even in the face of pending litigation, no court will require a 
litigant to retain each and every single piece of paper or every document
in electronic or paper form or store every kind of backup tape that may
resulting in the destruction of evidence.  But bad faith is not essential.  If such evidence
is mishandled through carelessness, and the other side is prejudiced, we think that the 
district court is entitled to consider imposing sanctions, including exclusion of the 
evidence.”).
167. Arteria Prop. Pty Ltd. v. Universal Funding V.T.O., Inc., No. 05-4896 (PGS),
2008 WL 4513696, at *4 (D. N.J. Oct. 1, 2008) (stating that some courts require a 
showing of intentional conduct before giving an adverse inference instruction, whereas 
other courts require only a showing of negligence). 
168. Paris Bus. Prods., Inc. v. Genisis Techs., LLC, No. 07-0260 (JBS), 2007 WL
3125184, at *3 (D. N.J. Oct. 24, 2007) (quoting Mosaid Techs., Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,
348 F. Supp. 2d 332, 338 (D. N.J. 2004)).
169. Paluch v. Dawson, No. 1:CV-06-01751, 2008 WL 2785638, at *8, *13 (M.D. 
Pa. July 17, 2008) (directing the defendants to provide additional information but overall 
finding that they largely complied in good faith with the discovery requests). 
170. Miles v. Elliot, No. 94 4669, 2011 WL 857320, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 10, 2011).
171. See Arteria Prop., 2008 WL 4513696, at *4 (“[D]istrict courts within the 
Third Circuit are split regarding the showing necessary to satisfy the ‘actual suppression’ 
requirement. Some have found that an adverse inference arises when spoliation ‘was 
intentional, and indicates fraud and a desire to suppress the truth, and . . . not . . . where 
the destruction was a matter of routine with no fraudulent intent.’”). 
172. Redish, supra note 4, at 592. 
173. Id.
 174. See Spencer, supra note 21, at 2006–08. 
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be relevant.175 Courts recognize that this would be a foolhardy approach
to the preservation problem.176 The standard courts want litigants to 
follow is that parties should preserve documents that are inimitable and
germane to the lawsuit.177 In other words, relevant information that
parties know would be harmful to them, yet useful to an adversary, must 
be retained.178  The duty to preserve in its broadest sense covers all relevant 
information.179  Preservation duties attach to information that is in existence
at the time litigation is anticipated and extend to any information created
afterward that is relevant to the lawsuit.180  So, the duty to preserve may 
not really be the issue.181 Rather it is a party’s failure to act or not to
act and the manner in which such failure or inaction occurred that are the 
real culprits because parties have always had to preserve evidence that is
relevant to a lawsuit.182  What is evident is that all parties should be
reluctant to destroy data because such an act could have dire consequences
later.183  However, judging by the growth in e-discovery sanction requests
but the stagnant number of court-awarded sanctions,184 parties may 
prefer to destroy data and take a chance on not getting caught.
Most of the criticism of the duty to preserve concerns the attendant
costs of implementing the duty and the failure of courts to shift costs of
175. See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
(“Must a corporation, upon recognizing the threat of litigation, preserve every shred of
paper, every e-mail or electronic document, and every backup tape?  The answer is clearly,
‘no.’”).
176. Id.
 177. See, e.g., Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 591 (4th Cir. 2001)
(citing Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 1998)); Thompson v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93, 100 (D. Md. 2003).
178. Zubulake, 220 F.R.D. at 217 (stating that the duty to preserve attaches to
“anyone who anticipates being a party or is a party to a lawsuit” and such party “must
not destroy unique, relevant evidence that might be useful to an adversary”).
179. Id. at 218 (“[I]nformation that is relevant to the claims or defenses of any
party, or which is ‘relevant to the subject matter involved in the action’” must be preserved.
(quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1))). 
180. Id.
 181. See Convolve, Inc. v. Compaq Computer Corp., 223 F.R.D. 162, 175–76 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“[I]n the world of electronic data, the preservation obligation is not limited
simply to avoiding affirmative acts of destruction.”).
182. See id. at 176. 
183.  Hardaway et al., supra note 13, at 578. 
184. 2011 Mid-Year E-Discovery Update, GIBSON DUNN (July 22, 2011), http://www. 
gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2011Mid-YearE-DiscoveryUpdate.aspx (noting that the 
number of sanction requests in 2011 was higher than requests made during the same period
of 2010). 
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production to the requesting party.185  Traditionally, each party bore its
own cost of production during litigation.186 The electronic age has changed 
this. Now, more than ever, the cost burden on the producing party is
much more because of the sheer volume of ESI, the inaccessibility of ESI, 
and the custodianship issues associated with ESI.187  The problem is even
more dubious when one party is clearly not financially equal to the other
party.188  This was the case in Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC. If Zubulake 
had been forced to pay the costs of producing relevant e-mails from UBS 
Warburg, the litigation may have terminated without ever getting to the 
merits of the case.189 
The current standard for preservation and the subsequent finding of 
spoliation require all parties to be proactive in litigation preparation.190 
Requiring parties to begin preservation as soon as they know litigation is 
imminent is the best possible standard.191 This requirement gives guidance
by providing litigants a starting point for action in document preservation.192 
The current preservation standard courts use is not perfect because in 
many instances there is no one-size-fits-all in cases involving preservation.193 
Also, depending on the size of the participants in the litigation, the duty 
to preserve may cripple any attempt to have an elimination process for
data.194  However, considering the circumstances created by the electronic
185. See Mazza et al., supra note 1, ¶ 98 (“Cost-shifting battles are hotly contested 
and for good reason: decisions on motions regarding who will be required to pay for
discovery responses (the cost of which may run into the hundreds of thousands, if not 
tens of millions, of dollars) can impact severely how an action proceeds and in fact may 
be outcome-determinative in some cases.”). 
186. See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978). 
187. Withers, supra note 90, at 182. 
188. See, e.g., Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 316 (S.D.N.Y. 
2003). This was a seminal employment discrimination case where the court noted that 
attempting to come up with a test encompassing Rule 26(b)(1) and 26(b)(2) often caused 
the party requesting the discovery to be responsible for the cost of production. Id. at 
311, 316. 
189. See id. at 311–12. 
190. Broccoli v. Echostar Commc’ns Corp., 229 F.R.D. 506, 510 (D. Md. 2005)
(“A failure to preserve documents and records, once the duty to do so has been triggered,
raises the issue of spoliation of evidence.”).
191. See Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., 
LLC, 685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
192. See id.
 193. See Spencer, supra note 21, at 2031.  Professor Spencer points out that the 
appropriate sanction in different circumstances will be considered on a “case-by-case 
basis” by judges.  Id.
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age—the swiftness of creating documents and the swiftness of destroying 
documents195—this standard, for now, is good enough.
Courts have always had to go back in time to ferret out the start of 
litigants’ egregious or negligent conduct.196  Courts examine the facts of 
a case to determine misconduct after the events have occurred.197  Courts
make a “judgment call . . . by . . . reviewing . . . conduct through the 
backward lens known as hindsight.”198  In other words, sanctions are
determined by courts “in light of the full record in the case.”199  Because
courts use the same methodology to determine discovery misconduct,
whether it concerns electronic or paper discovery, pinpointing a time 
when parties should begin to preserve documents will have to be based 
on the specific situation before the court.200 
VI. CONCLUSION 
All parties to the lawsuit should take a proactive approach to the 
preservation of relevant electronic documents. Just as a party’s holding 
of relevant documents must institute litigation hold letters,201 a party 
initiating a lawsuit should also be required to be proactive by serving a 
notice of litigation letter on prospective defendants.202  Prospective
195. See generally Cameron G. Shilling, Electronic Discovery: Litigation Crashes 
into the Digital Age, 22 LAB. LAW. 207, 209–10 (2006) (discussing the effect of electronic 
data on discovery and problems associated with its deletion).
196. See, e.g., Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 
102–05 (2d Cir. 2002) (producing a timeline that documented discovery behavior by
Residential Funding Corporation, which was the basis of an adverse inference motion). 
197. See, e.g., id.
198. Pension Comm. of Univ. of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of Am. Sec., LLC, 
685 F. Supp. 2d 456, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
199. See, e.g., Cine Forty-Second St. Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 
602 F.2d 1062, 1068 (2d Cir. 1979) (stating that the plaintiff, through its own fault, had 
stopped the discovery phase of the litigation for almost four years) (citing Nat’l Hockey
League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 642 (1976)). 
200. See Residential Funding Corp., 306 F.3d at 105–06 (reviewing case-specific 
details to rule on a motion for sanctions).
201. A litigation hold letter requires parties engaged in litigation to retain relevant 
—including potentially relevant—documents and immediately “suspend the automatic 
deletion of e-mails and the writing over of backup tapes” that may be pertinent to the 
litigation process.  Patricia A. Bronte, Managing Electronic Discovery Successfully in
Insurance Coverage Litigation, in INSURANCE COVERAGE 2007: CLAIM TRENDS & LITIGATION
55, 63 (2007). 
202. Compare Frey v. Gainey Transp. Servs., Inc., No. 1:05-CV-1493-JOF, 2006
WL 2443787, at *9 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 22, 2006) (“The legal system does not permit 
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plaintiffs should send out the notice of litigation letter, particularly 
to those defendants known to have large amounts of electronic
information.203 The notice letters must not be vague but must be specific in 
form and substance to warn a litigant of impending suit.204  Such notice 
would allow a defendant adequate time to begin to preserve responsive 
documents during the time frame that forms the basis of the suit.205  Parties
would have an early start on locating and preserving relevant information. 
However, the notice of litigation letter does not remove a defendant’s 
duty to preserve relevant information where the defendant is put on notice 
of pending litigation prior to receipt of the notice of litigation letter.206 
Conversely, a simple dispute or disagreement, and nothing else, is 
insufficient to put a defendant on notice that litigation is imminent.207 
Putting more of the onus on the plaintiffs, by requiring them to act timely,
could help to level the litigation playing field.  This Author believes that 
plaintiffs should minimally include the following factors in their notice 
letters: (1) the cause of action; (2) the date giving rise to the cause of action;
discovery to begin in a lawsuit until after a party has been served with a complaint and 
answered, so it is difficult to allow a potential plaintiff to make an end run around the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by filing a preemptive ‘spoliation’ letter.”), with 
Consol. Aluminum Corp. v. Alcoa, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 335, 340–42 (M.D. La. 2006) (holding
that a demand letter sent by the purchaser of a processing plant to a vendor should have 
reasonably alerted the purchaser to anticipate litigation with the vendor, thereby triggering the
purchaser’s duty to preserve evidence).  In Alcoa, this was the first time the Fifth Circuit
addressed the standards of preservation of electronic evidence and applicable sanctions
where evidence had been spoliated.  244 F.R.D. at 339. 
203. See, e.g., SHARON D. NELSON ET AL., THE ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE AND DISCOVERY
HANDBOOK: FORMS, CHECKLISTS, AND GUIDELINES 87–89 (2006) (showing examples of 
preservation of evidence letters sent out to opposing counsel and third parties prior to 
litigation).
204. See Goodman v. Praxair Servs., Inc., 632 F. Supp. 2d 494, 511 (D. Md. 2009) 
(pointing out that “[i]t may be that a letter that merely identifies a dispute but expresses 
an invitation to discuss it or otherwise negotiate does not trigger the duty to preserve 
evidence”).
205. See Wisniewski v. PACOA LLC, No. 017131/09, 2011 WL 1205464, at *5 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. Mar. 31, 2011) (holding that letter sent to the defendant by the plaintiff’s former
counsel was insufficient to “establish any requisite ‘notice to preserve’ evidence relating
to a potential lawsuit” because it did not specifically request that the defendant preserve 
evidence relating to the date of the accident at issue).
206. See PML N. Am., LLC v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., No. 05-CV-70404-
DT, 2006 WL 3759914, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 20, 2006) (holding that the defendant
“was on notice of the potential of litigation” when it received a letter from the plaintiff 
informing the defendant to expect communication from the plaintiff’s attorney); Zubulake v.
UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 216–17 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that the duty to
preserve arose before the suit was filed because employees of the defendant who were 
associated with the plaintiff recognized the possibility that the plaintiff would file suit).
207. See, e.g., Goodman, 632 F. Supp. 2d at 510 (“The mere existence of a dispute
does not necessarily mean that parties should reasonably anticipate litigation or that the 
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(3) the date when suit is expected to be filed; (4) the court where the
action would be filed; (5) what kind of information should be preserved or
retained; and (6) the crucial factual time periods the plaintiff believes 
would encompass relevant documents needed from the defendant for the
litigation.208  The level of specificity of the notice letter, in terms of what
should be preserved, will depend on the case.209  Further, problems may 
arise when sending notice of litigation letters.  For instance, if the notice 
of litigation letter lists specific items to be preserved, then a defendant
may be able to avoid sanctions where there is a failure to preserve items
not specifically listed.210  However, many problems of this nature can be
resolved if the notice letter contains basic contract or statutory language
such as “including but not limited to” or “all other” information that may
be relevant to the lawsuit.211  Language used in notice letters must
be specifically drafted to contain sufficient detail and description so as 
not to be found too broad by the courts.212 These catchall phrases will 
place the producing party on notice that further production and 
preservation of relevant documents may still be needed. 
Court sanctions for e-discovery violations are on the rise.213  The threat of
sanctions for e-discovery violations may spur reactions formerly unheard 
of in litigation. For instance, insurance companies are offering extended 
208. Contra Thompson v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93, 100 
(D. Md. 2003) (discussing the plaintiff’s role in alerting an adversary of the duty to
preserve: “While a litigant certainly may request that an adversary agree to preserve
electronic records during the pendency of a case, or even seek a court order directing that 
this happen, it is not required . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 
209. See Swofford v. Eslinger, 671 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1287 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (finding 
that the defendants were not on notice to preserve evidence pivotal to the litigation because 
“[n]either preservation letter and no other notice to Defendants suggested that the uniforms 
should be preserved”). 
210. Id. (stating that because the defendants were not on notice to preserve the 
uniforms, jury instructions regarding the destruction of the uniforms were not warranted). 
211. See, e.g., Computek Computer & Office Supplies, Inc. v. Walton, 156 S.W.3d 
217, 220, 223 (Tex. App. 2005) (noting that the trial court ordered an injunction to stop
the defendants from “removing or destroying any files, or copies of files, including but 
not limited to Defendants’ computer or computer files” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The appellate court later found that the language was too broad because it did not
specifically refer to the defendants’ business activities in relation to the plaintiff. Id. at
223. The appellate court modified the injunction to apply to information that related to 
the plaintiff. Id. at 224. 
212. See id. at 223. 
213. Rachel M. Zahorsky, Policy Matter: Firm Plans Insurance Against Evidence 
Loss, A.B.A. J., Mar. 2011, at 31, 32. 
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coverage policies in anticipation of spoliation tort claims to protect 
customers who are in the business of acting as custodians of property
that is part of a case controversy.214  This same type of coverage may be
considered for e-discovery violations that give rise to sanctions. Such 
spoliation insurance coverage would not be determinative to the question 
of whether sanctions should be imposed.215 Some attorneys are
unconvinced of the need for spoliation insurance.216  Their belief is that if
an attorney feels the need to engage in conduct that gives rise to repeated 
sanction violations, then perhaps the attorney’s offending conduct should be
addressed so that there would be no need for spoliation coverage.217 But, 
if litigation is between one or more massive conglomerates, spoliation 
insurance looks like a good prophylactic idea.218  Even with the new
technological change ushered in by the electronic age, our adversarial 
system is still rooted in the obliteration of an opponent.219  Some believe
that the electronic age will force parties to cooperate.220  For instance, in 
Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Services Co., the court discussed the changing 
role that the electronic age would have on our adversarial system.221  The
court noted that our system would turn into one relying more on cooperation
between parties.222  But, due to the adversarial nature of our litigation 
system, the better parties understand their duties involving e-discovery, 
probably the more adept they will become at avoiding or camouflaging 
such duties in an attempt to win and get around sanctions.223  Avoidance
or camouflage tactics will probably give rise to more sanctions.224 
Lawyers will soon have another problem to contend with where failure to
understand what is required for litigation in an electronic age is concerned. 
Failing to be up to speed in e-discovery or ignorance of the e-discovery
language and tools can be an ethical violation.225  Other ethical issues for 
214. Id. at 31. 





220.  Id. at 169. 
PAUL & NEARON, supra note 21, at 168–69. 
221. 
222.  Id. at 365. 
 253 F.R.D. 354, 360–63 (D. Md. 2008). 
223. See Coleman (Parent) Holdings, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., No. CA 03-
5045 AI, 2005 WL 674885, at *6–10 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 23, 2005) (finding that the 
defendant’s repeated misrepresentation to the court regarding discovery compliance 
warranted sanctions of adverse inference jury instructions and attorneys’ costs and fees,
among others).
224. Id. at *9 (noting that Morgan Stanley had “deliberately and contumaciously
violated numerous discovery orders”). 
225. Joe Dysart, A Discovery: Study Tech-Aided Review Before It’s an Ethics Issue, 
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lawyers involve the type of e-discovery requests.  The court in Mancia
noted that ethical issues for lawyers arise when the requested discovery 
is excessive or when the lawyer’s response to e-discovery requests is
sluggish, evasive, or incomplete.226  In its discussion, the court referenced
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, and it is evident that there is
an attaching ethical responsibility to a lawyer’s fulfillment of the 
requirements of the FRCP, but specifically to those rules concerning 
discovery.227  An attorney’s ethical obligations during discovery also arose
in Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., where the court affirmed the district 
court’s finding of numerous ethical discovery violations by Qualcomm 
during a patent infringement case that led the court to find an exceptional 
case determination and to award attorneys’ fees to Broadcom.228 
As courts continue to adjudicate cases involving e-discovery, standards 
for preservation and spoliation will become clearer and clearer.229  Yet, 
why would the amended rules fail to have solutions to the rising costs of 
discovery230 that result when discovery problems arise during litigation? 
The answer, according to one author, is clear—the rules are broad because
the drafters of the rules, mostly judges, have a preference for broad
discretion.231  This broad discretion is burdening every aspect of  e-discovery 
litigation. 
In light of the massive production of electronic information, courts, 
litigants, and society may have to look less for the truth in litigation to 
ensure some degree of predictability of what is required to satisfy
preservation, spoliation, and sanction standards.232  There have always
226. Mancia, 253 F.R.D. at 362–63. 
227. Id. (noting that attorneys are required to be ethically above board in complying 
with the FRCP).
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been disagreements among circuits on different issues.233  Our system of 
litigation has never been perfect.  E-discovery may very well be another
of such issues where circuits and courts will have to agree to disagree.
233. See Flury v. Daimler Chrysler Corp., 427 F.3d 939, 943–44 (11th Cir. 2005) 
(adopting the majority position, the court noted that “[c]ourts are split as to the question 
of whether state or federal law governs the imposition of sanctions for spoliation of
evidence in a diversity suit.  The majority of circuits have found that federal law applies.”); 
Denver Health & Hosp. Auth. v. Beverage Distribs. Co., 843 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1177 (D.
Colo. 2012) (holding that FRCP 9(b) did not apply to a negligent misrepresentation claim and
acknowledging that there is a circuit split on the issue); see also Balt. Cnty. v. Cigna 
Healthcare, 238 F. App’x 914, 921–22 (4th Cir. 2007) (noting that Rule 9(b) does not
apply to negligent misrepresentation claims).  But see Trooien v. Mansour, 608 F.3d 
1020, 1028 (8th Cir. 2010) (noting that Minnesota law considers any misrepresentation 
claim, negligent or otherwise, to be a claim of fraud subject to Rule 9(b)’s requirements); 
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Aniero Concrete Co., 404 F.3d 566, 583 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that
Rule 9(b) applies to negligent misrepresentation claims).
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